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Abstract
While there is a large body of literature on the determinants of allocation of intergovernmental
scal transfers in developed countries, this kind of study is still very limited for developing countries,
especially Subsaharan countries. Using an original micro-level public nance panel data from Senegal,
we address three issues: (1) Does the Senegalese allocation system of scal transfers conform to
the guidance of normative theory, in particular, to the equity principle? (2) Does this allocation
system eliminate politically motivated targeting of transfers? (3) If not, what kind of political factors
explain the horizontal allocation of scal resources? By rigorously estimating a panel data for 67
local governments (communes) from 1997 to 2009, our results tend to show that equity concerns
do not a¤ect the allocation of intergovernmental grants in Senegal, leading to the conclusion that
the resources distribution system does not comply with the dictates of normative theory. Moreover,
we nd evidences that political considerations inuence the horizontal allocation of transfers. In
particular, our analysis suggests that transfers allocation follows a pattern of tactical redistribution
more than patronage, swing communes being targeted while partisan communes are not.
JEL Classication: H20, H77, O12.
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1 Introduction
While scal decentralization has been adopted by a large part of the developing world,
there is a broad consensus in the literature that the benets expected from decentralization
will not materialize if the system of intergovernmental scal transfers does not rely on an
equitable and e¢ cient horizontal allocation mechanism. Although a huge literature on the
determinants of allocation of central grants in developed countries exists, this kind of study is
still limited for developing countries, especially Subsaharan countries. This paper attempts to
ll the gap in the empirical literature by raising the issue of how such transfers are allocated
across local governments in a Subsaharan country, Senegal.
The traditional theoretical view on central transfers is that they should be guided by
equity and e¢ ciency considerations, a welfare maximizing government wanting to reallocate
resources between richer and poorer jurisdictions and to correct for externalities (Buchanan,
1950, Oates, 1972, Gramlich, 1977). Actually, a number of empirical studies have pointed
out that political factors are more relevant in explaining the allocation of grants. Begin-
ning with Wright (1974), economic historians examined the question of how transfers were
allocated amongst American states during the New Deal in the 1930s and found that po-
litical variables explained this allocation considerably better than economic considerations.
As Banful (2010) notices, empirical studies have concerned an array of countries like Alba-
nia (Case, 2001), Argentina (Porto and Sanguinetti, 2001), Australia (Bungey, Grossman,
and Kenyon, 1991, Worthington and Dollery, 1998), Canada (Albouy, 2010), Ghana (Ban-
ful, 2010, Miguel and Zaidi, 2003), India (Khemani, 2007, Cole, 2009, Arulampalam et al.,
2009), Israel (Alperovich, 1984), Japan (Meyer and Naka, 1999), Portugal (Pereira, 1996,
Veiga and Pinho, 2007), Russian Federation (Treisman, 1996), Sweden (Dahlberg and Jo-
hansson, 2002), Tanzania (Boex, 2003) and the United States (Anderson and Tollison, 1991,
Wallis, 1998). An international comparison of these works shows that, besides local ex-
penditure needs and scal capacity, other factors including electoral concerns and political
inuence play important roles in the horizontal allocation of grants. Central governments ap-
pear to be opportunistic, using transfers to maximize their chances of re-election or partisan,
allocating grants to further interests of their political support groups (Cox, 1986, Grossman,
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1994, Case, 2001, Banful, 2010).
A common view is that basing the allocation of scal transfers on a formula limits the
discretionary power of politicians in distributing central grants so that this strategy has been
widely adopted in the developing world (Banful, 2010). In this paper, we test the e¤ectiveness
of formulas in eliminating discretion by analyzing how transfers are allocated across local
governments in Senegal where a formula allocation mechanism is employed. More precisely,
we intend to tackle the three following issues: (1) Does the Senegalese allocation formula
allow a distribution of scal transfers that conforms to the dictates of normative theory, in
particular, to the equity principle? (2) Is such an allocation system actually su¢ cient to
eliminate politically motivated targeting of grants? (3) If not, what kind of political factors
explain the allocation of scal resources? This paper adds to the existing empirical literature
studying horizontal allocation of transfers and we believe its contribution to be twofold. First,
to our knowledge, this is one of the rst papers to exploit an original micro-level public nance
panel data from a Subsaharan country to test political economy theories of scal transfers
allocation. It allows us to see to what extent results obtained for developed countries can be
observed for a developing country.1 Besides, Senegal is a particularly interesting case since a
received wisdom says that transfers allocation is determined by political a¢ nity between the
central and local governments, as it is the case in many African countries (Banful, 2010), and
some mayors deplore a discriminatory and opaque distribution of grants.2 Second, we employ
a consistent econometric method which generates credible empirical results. Indeed, we use
the xed e¤ects vector decomposition (FEVD) estimator developed by Plümper and Troeger
(2007) to avoid failure to control for heterogeneity of local governments and ine¢ ciency in
estimating the e¤ect of variables that have little within variance, common issues in this
kind of study. Moreover, to test whether equity concerns are dominant in the allocation of
transfers, we compute an innovative poverty index at local level using the Demographic and
Health Survey (DHS) and its geographic data.
After having briey reviewed the literature on normative and political economy determi-
1 The ndings of Miguel and Zaidi (2003) concerning Ghana already suggest that in African democracies
ruling parties are able to reward their supporters and use the advantages of incumbency to win subsequent
elections.
2 See, for instance, Le ministre Aliou Sow brocardé par Alioune Sarr, le Pcr de Notto Diobasse, Le Peuple,
October 18th 2010 (http://lepeuple-sn.com) or Fonds de dotation : Aliou Sow fait la part belle à sa collectivité
selon le PCR de Ndindy, Rewmi, November 2nd 2010 (http://www.rewmi.com/).
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nants of scal transfers, we rigorously investigate the empirical importance of such determi-
nants in the distribution of central grants across local governments in Senegal by estimating
a panel data for 67 communes from 1997 to 2009. (1) Estimation results tend to show
that equity concerns do not impact the allocation of intergovernmental grants in Senegal,
leading to the conclusion that the resources distribution system does not follow the dictates
of the normative theory. (2) We also nd evidences of politically motivated targeting of
transfers despite the formula-based system. (3) In particular, our results highlight three
kinds of political motivation. First, our analysis suggests that transfers allocation follows
a tactical redistribution, which consists in targeting swing communes to achieve electoral
success. Second, local governments which are better represented in parliament seem to re-
ceive larger grants, conrming one of the most consistent empirical results in this literature.
Third, ethnic fractionalization seems to be positively correlated with per capita transfers
which might indicate that the central government uses scal resources as a way to pacify
potentially troubled areas.
Section 2 o¤ers a brief review of the literature on the determinants of intergovernmen-
tal transfers. Section 3 presents the institutional background of transfers in Senegal, the
empirical model, strategy and ndings. Section 4 concludes with some policy implications.
2 Normative and political economy determinants of intergov-
ernmental scal transfers: A literature review
Three stands of the literature consider factors that may inuence the distribution of central
transfers across local governments (Boex and Martinez-Vazquez, 2005). First, public nance
literature provides normative dictates on how intergovernmental transfers should be allo-
cated. Second, voter-choice models in public choice literature explain how electoral concerns
could a¤ect the central governments scal choices in distributing scal resources to local
jurisdictions. Third, political economy arguments contribute to understand the allocation of
grants by considering non-electoral arguments.
First, there is a consensus in the local public nance literature that a system of scal
transfers should be designed to achieve equity and e¢ ciency in the allocation of resources
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(Buchanan, 1950, Oates, 1972, Gramlich, 1977). The central government is assumed to be
a benevolent planner, which maximizes social welfare. The rationale behind the equity
principle is the need for a reduction in horizontal scal imbalances existing between local
jurisdictions. Thereby, transfers should compensate the unequal access to local public goods
and services generated by the uneven distribution of resources across the country. The
pursuit of this objective leads to expect a pro-poor allocation of grants. However, most
empirical studies nd that wealthier local governments receive greater transfers, indicating
that political considerations outweigh those of equity (see Kraemer, 1997, Alm and Boex,
2002, Wallis, 1998, Meyer and Naka, 1999). The economic e¢ ciency objective seeks to
correct for externalities and compensate spillover e¤ects among jurisdictions in the provision
of some local public services. This incentive objective would result in the central government
providing greater grants in response to higher expenditure needs.3 In empirical studies,
local expenditure needs and costs generally have a positive impact on the level of transfers
received by a local government. Exceptions include Nigeria (Alm and Boex, 2002) and
Mexico (Kraemer, 1997) where expenditure needs have no e¤ect and a negative impact on
grants received, respectively.4
Second, the literature on targeted redistribution distinguishes between patronage, which
consists in rewarding political supporters, and tactical redistribution, which aims at achiev-
ing electoral success. Greater political support for the central government in a particular
jurisdiction can be rewarded by greater transfers. For instance, Miguel and Zaidi (2003)
nd evidence from Ghana of core supporterstargeting, districts from where the ruling party
won all the parliamentary seats.5 This patronage can also be tactical, however. Indeed, Cox
(1986) argues that the optimal strategy for risk-averse opportunistic candidates is to favor
partisan jurisdictions to maintain existing political supports. Similarly, Bungey, Grossman,
and Kenyon (1991) and Leyden (1992) show that party closeness between central and local
politicians increases returns in term of central governments support, and therefore the level
of transfers. Case (2001) interprets empirical ndings of greater grants in Albania to juris-
3 Moreover, Albouy (2010) shows that providing higher grant levels to jurisdictions that pay higher central
taxes is a mechanism for reducing ine¢ cient migration.
4 We also have to note that transfers pursue a vertical scal balance objective, that is, ensure that the
revenues and expenditures of each level of government are approximately equal (Weingast, 2009).
5 Pereira (1996) also nds that intergovernmental grants in Portugal were designed to reward central
governmentspolitical support.
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dictions where the President received more votes in the past election as evidence of targeting
of ef districts, considered as more pivotal. If the central government can reward its sup-
porters or target it to maintain political support, it can also favor its opponents (Treisman,
1996) or swingjurisdictions, where the distance of vote shares between the largest parties
is small. Electoral results in these jurisdictions are assumed to be determined by how much
they receive in resource transfers from the center. Arulampalam, Dasgupta, Dhillon, and
Dutta (2009) construct a model where the federal government allocates transfers to states
that are aligned with the incumbent party but also swing. Using Indian panel data, they
validate their theoretical model.6 In the context of an African country, Banful (2010) also
nds evidence that per capita grants are higher in Ghanaian districts where vote margins
in the previous presidential election were lower. Following the predictions of the well known
model of opportunistic political budgetary cycles provided by Rogo¤ and Sibert (1988), the
central government is also expected to transfer more resources in election years to increase
its likelihood of re-election. According to Worthington and Dollery (1998), grants in local
election years would be more productive due to a heightened awareness of policies but, in the
case of central elections, the returns from purchasing political capital in this manner would
be o¤set by direct political benets of central direct expenditure so that transfers should
decrease.
Third, beyond electoral considerations, political decision-making processes are likely to
be captured by powerful interest groups. Assuming that local o¢ cials try to extract as
much resources as possible from the center, those with higher bargaining power may receive
larger grants. The fact that local jurisdictions with higher political representation benet
from greater transfers is one of the most robust empirical ndings (Wright, 1974, Porto
and Sanguinetti, 2001, Khemani, 2007).7 Smaller jurisdictions are also expected to receive
greater per capita transfers, which may be caused by scale economies or by their potentially
higher lobbying power. In particular, this bias may be explained by an urge to secure
6 Cole (2009) also nds that state governments in India supply greater subsidized agriculture loans to
electoral districts where the ruling party had a narrow margin of victory (or loss) and Johansson (2003)
provides theoretical and empirical evidence that swing Swedish municipalities receive larger grants than other
groups.
7 For instance, Atlas (1995) shows that the allocation of per capita federal net spending in the United
States from 1972 to 1990 was a¤ected by statesper capita congressional representation and highlights that
the institutional basis of political representation a¤ects spending allocations across states.
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broad political support.8 In the context of a developing country, central governments may
also use economic means to deal with social conicts.9 A common argument in favor of
decentralization is that local governments are enabled to allocate public spending in line
with the preferences of heterogeneous local communities. However, Tranchant (2010) shows
that, while this hypothesis may be relevant for local majorities, it is not the case for local
minorities, who are not in a position of strength. In this context, scal decentralization
can increase local conicts, marginalized ethnic minorities clashing against powerful local
majorities. Hence, the central government may use transfers as an instrument to pacify
potentially troubled areas like ethnically fractionalized jurisdictions (Treisman, 1996).10
3 The determinants of intergovernmental scal transfers in
Senegal: Empirical evidence
In this section, we intend to determine whether the Senegalese allocation system conforms
to the dictates of the normative theory and if this system eliminates politically motivated
targeting of transfers. We rst investigate the institutional background of intergovernmental
transfers in Senegal, then we specify our econometric model and strategy. Lastly, we present
our principal ndings resulting from the estimation of a panel data for 67 communes from
1997 to 2009.
3.1 Intergovernmental transfers in Senegal: Institutional background
Senegal has shown a remarkable political stability since its independence in 1960, which
was strengthened by peaceful presidential transitions. Abdou Diouf served ve terms as
President. He was defeated in February 2000 by opposition leader Abdoulaye Wade, by
direct popular vote in the majority (two-round) system. The regime of Abdoulaye Wade
8 Empirical work on lump-sum grants in Portugal (Pereira, 1996) supports the politico-economic hypothesis
and rejects the hypothesis that economies of scale are the main explanatory cause for the observed regres-
sivity of per capita transfers. Indeed, he shows that per capita grants decrease with the population size of
communities even after controlling for the e¤ect of economies of scale which might be captured by the density
variable.
9 In particular, Senegal has to deal with a violent separatist movement in the southern region of the
Casamance.
10 Note that Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005) suggested that ethnic polarization measures are more
appropriate than fractionalization indices to capture social conict.
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follows four decades of Socialist Party rule. He was re-elected in February 2007, at the end
of the seven-year term.11 Local governments are directly elected by local population from a
list in one round. Local elections occurred, the same day for all communes, in March 2002
and 2009.12 The fact that the voice of the opposition was loudly heard in the latest local
elections, including the defeat of Wades own son, Karim, in Dakar, could be a sign that
Senegals democracy remains relatively strong. Our dataset covers all national and local
elections which occurred in the period 1997-2009.
Decentralization has been implemented since the beginning of the independence in 1960
to move government closer to citizens. However, 1990 marked a turning point in the process
with the abolition of the tutelary power of the center within the communesexecutive. The
last step is constituted by the adoption in 1996 of the new laws of decentralization: law 96-06
carrying the Local Government Code, law 96-07 dening transferred competencies, and law
96-09 xing the territorial administration. Senegal is divided into eleven regions (régions)
which are subdivided into 67 communes, 43 communes darrondisements which are further
divided into 320 communautés rurales.13 Local governments are endowed with legal per-
sonality and benet from the administration principle according to which local jurisdictions
manage themselves freely by elected councils. The commune has to ensure the best living
conditions for the whole population.14 The competencies of Senegalese communes range
from the maintenance of communal properties or the management of local public works to
environmental protection with, for instance, the adoption of measures limiting pollution, and
include the management of local employments and assistance to places of worship. Table
1 presents Senegalese communes revenue sources and their evolution. Local own-revenue
represents around 85% of local resources and are divided into tax and non-tax own-revenue.
The rst one is mainly constituted by taxes on property, patent, advertisement, water, elec-
tricity and waste removal while the second one is related to the public domainsoccupation
(markets, car parks, tow pound...) and to some administrative services. Central transfers
represent around 10% of the total local resources and have become more important in ab-
11 Since 2007, the president is elected for a ve-year term renewable once.
12 Local o¢ cials are elected for a six-year mandate but local elections, initially planned for May 2008, were
reported in March 2009 due to the modication of the regional administrative zoning.
13 There is also an administrative level between regions and communes : the departments (départements)
but they are managed by a representative of the central government.
14 See law 96-06 with the Local Governments Code.
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solute terms. One of the main features of scal decentralization in Senegal is the increasing
level of revenue at local level. However, local resources remain insu¢ cient to provide local
basic public services15 and important inequalities appear between communes: the resources
of the ten poorest communes represent 1 % of the resources of the ve richest ones. There is
also an important variability across jurisdictions, which stays relatively constant over time.
In 2009, communes such as Ranerou, Oussouye and Foundiougne received more than four
times the national average, while other jurisdictions like Pikine or Bargny received a transfer
per capita ten times smaller than that amount.
State subsidies should mitigate the lack of resources and reduce horizontal scal imbal-
ances. The design and implementation of transfers deserves serious concern, in particular,
in developing countries (see Bird and Smart, 2002, for a survey of central transfers systems
adopted in a number of developing countries). Senegal employs a formula-based resources
allocation mechanism. Finances law xes a minimum amount of transfers as an annual
percentage of central tax revenue. This then amount depends on a percentage of the Value
Added Tax collected for the benet of central government. Transfers are distributed between
local authorities according to criteria annually xed by decree after consulting the National
Council of Development of Local Authorities. This council, in charge of the follow-up of the
decentralization process, is constituted by the Senegalese President, the members of the gov-
ernment and representatives of deconcentrated services of the central government and of local
governments. The allocations criteria are twofold. First, there is a compensation criterion:
around 80% of the total transfer is distributed according to the cost of local public spending
induced by the transfer of competences and responsibilities from the central government to
the local authorities. In practice, the central government only considers spending made by
the local government the previous year. Second, the rest of the amount is divided into two
parts; a rst part (70 %) is distributed in equal shares between jurisdictions and a second
part (30 %) is distributed towards the demographic importance of each jurisdiction.
Our empirical work will help to determine if these criteria are su¢ cient to allow an
e¢ cient and equitable distribution of resources and to forbid the incentives of politicians to
divert resources for personal gain.
15 Tax own-revenue of all communes represents on average only 6 % of the central tax revenue
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3.2 The basic empirical model
To test whether the allocation of transfers is inuenced by economic considerations and
the presence and the nature of any politically motivated targeting of resource, we use the
general empirical framework followed in the literature (Boex and Martinez-Vazquez, 2005).
Per capita amounts of transfers received by a local government are regressed upon sets of
equity/e¢ ciency and public choice variables that may impact centers scal decision.
To determine whether the Senegalese system conforms to the dictates of the normative
theory we consider scal incapacity and expenditure needs. We rst examine the impact of
a local governments scal incapacity on the size of the transfers it receives by using a DHS
poverty index (see the following section 3.3.1). If equity concerns are at play in the allocation
of transfers, we should nd a positive coe¢ cient associated with scal incapacity. Second,
we include local expenditure needs and costs in our econometric model (e¢ ciency principle).
The variables that are generally used to measure local expenditure needs are demographic
variables such as the size of the school-aged population, the economically dependent popula-
tion, or urbanization (Meyer and Naka, 1999, Wallis, 1998).16 The population density is also
commonly used to measure the per capita cost of providing local public goods.17 We retain
two variables; urbanization rate and population density. While we unambiguously expect a
negative coe¢ cient associated with population density, it is not possible to know a priori
which of rural or urban sets of needs dominate.18
We then consider the inuence of electoral concerns in the allocation of grants. We
introduce a qualitative dummy variable that indicates if the central and local governments
are of the same political party. This variable allows us to test the existence of patronage
and Cox (1986) model, according to which the optimal strategy of political candidates is to
favor their supporters. We also include a variable that measures the di¤erence in vote shares
expressed in absolute values between the central government party and its main opponent,
16 Generally, instead of using physical infrastructure measures such as hospital beds or the number of
schools, it is preferable to measure the number of citizens with a certain need, such as infant mortality or
school-aged population, which are free from incentive problems.
17 Presumably, the lower the population density in a jurisdiction, the higher the unit cost of delivering
social services, since the provision of public services increases with a more dispersed population. It may also
be more costly to deliver government services across a larger land area.
18 Indeed, rural areas may su¤er from inadequate transport or electrication while urban areas have special
needs associated with congestion, pollution or urban blight (Treisman, 1996).
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in the last local election in each commune (see Case, 2001 and Dahlberg and Johansson,
2002).19 With this variable, we test the prediction that swing communes are targeted by
the incumbent party. Moreover, two dummy variables for elections, central and local, are
included in order to account for time-periods when ability to purchase political capital may
vary from the norm (Veiga and Pinho, 2007). Since elections are held at the beginning
of the year, we consider the year before elections. Following the prediction of Worthington
and Dollery (1998), local and national election years should exhibit a positive and negative
coe¢ cient, respectively.
Lastly, we introduce the number of deputies represented by departments, a local gov-
ernment with larger political representation per capita being expected to extract larger per
capita transfer. We also consider the relative population size of the commune to test the
existence of a bias in favor of smaller jurisdictions. In the particular context of a devel-
oping country, central decisions may also concern ethnic fractionalization, transfers being a
potential instrument to avoid local conicts.20
Finally, we dene the following empirical model:
Transfersit = Normativeit + 'Electoralit + Politicalit + "it; (1)
Indicators used for each category are summarized in Table 2.
3.3 Econometric framework
Before introducing our econometric strategy, we present our composite measure of local scal
incapacity, based on a DHS poverty index.
3.3.1 An indicator of local incapacity
Following studies that rely on composite measures of local incapacity, we propose to estimate
a poverty index using the 1997 and 2005 DHS with their geographic data.21 Due to the abun-
dance of household survey data on asset ownership and the considerable biases measurement
19 Two main concepts are used in the literature. Swing voters are dened as those with weak party prefer-
ences, while swing jurisdictions are those where the distance of vote shares between the central government
party and its main opponent is minimal. We focus on the second one.
20 We also consider ethnic polarization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005).
21 It represents around 8000 representative households for each survey.
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error associated with reported income or consumption, a substantial body of literature has
developed an asset-based measure of wealth. Filmer and Pritchett (2001) concluded that the
DHS wealth index actually performed better than the traditional consumption or expendi-
ture index in explaining di¤erences in economic status. Hence, in the footsteps of Filmer and
Pritchett (1999) and Sahn and Stifel (2003), we compute a composite poverty indicator from
the DHS surveys.22 However, since the DHS wealth index has been criticized as being too
urban in its construction, we propose, as suggested by Rutstein (2008), to produce a single
national-level composite index from wealth indexes that have been separately constructed for
the urban and rural areas. Table 3 summarizes the assets included in the Principal Compo-
nents Analysis (PCA)23 for each index and their coe¢ cients for the DHS 2005.24 Conversion
adjustments are made to map urban and rural indexes onto the national index.25 Then, we
divide the national index into quintiles of the national household population and determine
the percentage of the poor in each department. Table 4 gives the proleof a household that
belongs to the rst quintile in 2005 and Figures 1 gives the percentage of poor households
by region.
3.3.2 Econometric issues and strategy
Our econometric model is quite similar to those considered in the literature and su¤ers from
several defects. We then present our econometric strategy.
22 The general methodology used to calculate the wealth index is given in Filmer and Pritchett (2001). The
specic approach used in the DHS is described in Rutstein and Johnson (2004).
23 It is a technique for extracting from a set of variables those few orthogonal linear combinations of the
variables that capture the common information most successfully (for a detailed explanation, see Filmer and
Pritchett, 2001).
24 Based on descriptive statistics, we thought that possession of most livestock would be exclusively rural
and some other items such as computer or internet access would be exclusively urban. The construction of
the national index uses the set of indicator variables that the rural and urban areas have in common and is
restricted to those that correlate with wealth in the same direction
25 The level and distribution adjustment values are found by regressing the value of each households
area-specic index scores onto its national index score. For instance, with the DHS 2005, we have:
Urban : WIn = 0:24 + 0:41WIu (2)
Rural : WIn =  1:09 + 0:37WIr (3)
where WIn;WIu; and WIr are the national, urban-specic, and rural-specic wealth index scores, respec-
tively. We also use a quadratic form of the regressions since it improves the t a little.
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Econometric issues First, we correct for all time-invariant community characteristics,
observed or unobserved, and all year e¤ects.26 Local governments di¤er in ways that are
captured only imperfectly by our economic and political variables and these persistent dif-
ferences may produce signicant di¤erences in transfers. So, we include a commune-specic
e¤ect, i. Then, omitted variables that vary over time but are constant between communes
can inuence the amount of transfers available and received and, at the same time, the scal
capacities of communes. By introducing time dummies (Tt) we correct this potential en-
dogeneity bias due to omitted variables. We should limit the articial positive correlation
between the scal capacity and transfers, both increasing because of their common corre-
lation with a third variable, for instance, the national economic conjuncture.27 Second, we
consider endogeneity bias due to reverse causality. This turns out to be important for a num-
ber of variables, especially for scal incapacity. Indeed, local spending, in part nanced by
central transfers, may reduce local poverty. Hence, if jurisdictions with higher transfers tend
to have higher scal capacity, then, estimates will show that jurisdictions with higher scal
capacity receive larger transfers. However, in our case, the scal incapacity index represents
a more permanent status than does either income or consumption so that transfers at time
t probably cannot a¤ect the level of wealth at time t. If doubts remain, we propose to use
the lagged value of scal incapacity indicator to test the robustness of our estimations. Con-
cerning political variables, if we believe that politicians use public resources to buy support,
we must also believe that transfers have an e¤ect on electoral results. However, since we use
values of electoral outcomes that are determined before the start of a scal year, transfers
are unable to a¤ect past results so that the coe¢ cient of political a¢ liation variable should
not be biased. We could also consider the possibility of a vote with feet, where people are
encouraged to migrate when they perceive situations to be better in another jurisdiction,
such as a higher level of transfers. However, we think that this potential bias is limited since
Tiebouts model rests on assumptions of perfect mobility and information, which are seldom
found in developing countries (Bardhan, 2002). Finally, since we regress central transfers on
explanatory variables of which some are observed on a more aggregate level, we introduce
26 Fiscal transfers have an important characteristic to lead a relevant statistical analysis: their amount
varies signicantly over time, allowing the use of panel econometric methods.
27 When we introduce dummy variables for election years we cannot introduce time dummies, so we will
add Tt, a trend variable which accounts for the common trend in local governmentstransfers.
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department cluster (Moulton, 1990).
Econometric strategy A panel data approach allows us to control for the potentially
large number of unmeasured explanatory variables by estimating a xed-e¤ects(FE) model.
However, the FE model does not allow the estimation of time-invariant variables and results
from its ine¢ ciency in estimating the e¤ect of variables that have little within variance
(Baltagi, 2001, Wooldridge, 2002, Hsiao, 2003).28 In order to assess coe¢ cients of time-
constant or rarely changing variables, and to control for commune specic e¤ects, we propose
to use the FEVD estimator developed by Plümper and Troeger (2007).29 This estimator,
based on a three-step procedure, allows a decomposition of the unit xed e¤ect (i) into
two parts; a part explained by the time-invariant variables and an unexplained part, bhi.30
Regression (1) becomes:
Transfersit = Normativeit + 'Electoralit + Politicalit + Tt + bhi + "it; (4)
Based on Monte Carlo simulations, Plümper and Troeger (2007) nd that the vector de-
composition model performs far better than pooled OLS, Random-E¤ect (RE), and the
Hausman-Taylor procedure.31
To capture the potential persistency in central transfers, we also consider the dynamic
version of our model by introducing the lagged dependent variable. This yields the inconsis-
tency of xed-e¤ect estimators (see Nickell, 1981) so that we use the GMM-System estimator
(Blundell and Bond, 1998).
28 In our case, for instance, ethnic variables, which are time-invariant variables, are dropped in the xed
e¤ect model so that it is impossible to determinate whether these variables a¤ect the allocation of scal
transfers.
29 Rarely changing variables are dened as having a low within variance. Our variables of political and
ethnic factors, scal capacity, urbanization rate and population are rarely changing variables with a little
within variance.
30 A formal explanation of this estimator is given in Plümper and Troeger (2007).
31 An alternative answer to assess coe¢ cients of time-constant variables and to control for commune-specic
e¤ects is to use a RE model. However, this estimator implies orthogonality between explanatory variables
and the error term, a hypothesis that does not seems to be relevant in our case. The Hausman test actually
conrms that we should use FE estimators.
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3.4 Data and estimation results
Data for this study come from a variety of sources. Data on scal transfers are drawn
from the Municipal Development Partnership, and local characteristics like population, area,
urbanization rate and ethnic composition come from the General Population and Housing
Census and from the National Institute of Statistics and Demography of the Ministry of the
Economy and Finance of Senegal. The results of legislative elections come from the National
Assembly and the results of local elections come from the Independent National Electoral
Committee. We constructed a panel data for 67 communes from 1997 to 2009.32
Table 5 gives estimation results. First, we test the static model with the FEVD estimator.
To test the robustness of our estimations, we introduce progressively a trend (2) and a
department cluster (3), we use alternative indicators (4),33 the lagged value of the scal
incapacity indicator (5) and year dummies instead of the trend variable (6). Then, we
estimate the dynamic model with one-step robust GMM-System estimator (7).34
Does the central government assist jurisdictions with poor tax bases and greater socio-
economic needs as it should according to normative guidance? Equity concerns seem not to
be at play in determining the allocation of scal transfers. Indeed, we nd a negative and
signicant coe¢ cient associated with our indicator of scal incapacity indicating that poorer
local governments receive smaller intergovernmental transfers. This result is consistent with
most empirical studies (Kraemer, 1997, Alm and Boex, 2002, Wallis, 1998, Meyer and Naka,
1999). Estimation results support the hypothesis that expenditure needs have an e¤ect
on transfer allocation. Indeed, the urbanization rate is negatively correlated with scal
transfers suggesting that transfers alleviate special rural problems. However, population
density, used to measure the per capita cost of providing local public goods, seems to be
positively correlated with scal transfers, probably capturing urban needs since a higher
32 Note that, when we introduce the number of representatives in parliament, the panel data include data
for 67 communes from 1998 to 2009 since we only have results of legislative elections since 1998. When
we consider political a¢ liation variables, the panel data include data from 2002 to 2009 since we have local
election results for 2002 and 2009.
33 We consider PSit, the score of the president in o¢ ce at the previous local election instead of PAit and
ethnic polarization, EPit; instead of EFit (see Table 3).
34 We assume the weak exogeneity of the lagged dependant variable and the strict exogeneity of other
explanatory variables. The lagged levels of variables are instruments in regressions in level as well as in
regressions in di¤erence. Following Roodman (2009) we collapse instruments and limit their number to avoid
non optimal weight matrix, biased standard errors, and incorrect overidentication tests. With the Hansen
test and AR(2) test, we conclude that orthogonality conditions are respected.
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degree of urbanization is generally associated with higher population density.
Is the allocation of scal transfers also guided by political logic despite the formula-based
system? Our results actually suggest that normative guidance is not the only motivation
that determines the distribution of grants across communes. First, as regards electoral con-
cerns, while supporter communes do not appear to receive more transfers, greater resources
seem to be provided to local governments that are more swing. Indeed, coe¢ cient associated
with our proxy for swing communes is always negative and signicant at 1% level. Contrary
to the ndings of Case (2001) and Miguel and Zaidi (2003), the center does not seem to
target more resources to its supporters. Transfers are not targeted to areas in which political
support is concentrated to maximize return in terms of votes, as predicted by Cox (1986).
Our result is closer to Cole (2009), who nds that politicians, who care about winning elec-
tion, target swing jurisdictions. It also reinforces the ndings of Banful (2010) suggesting
that swing districts can be targeted in an African context. We cannot clearly conrm the
predictions of Worthington and Dollery (1998). Indeed, the year before national election is
negatively but not always signicantly correlated with grants and coe¢ cient associated with
the year before local elections is positive but rarely signicant. Second, other political and
ethnic considerations play important roles in the distribution of per capita transfers across
communes. This last point is conrmed by the positive association between transfers and
political economy determinants such as representatives in parliament, population and ethnic
fractionalization. Indeed, greater representation per voter seems actually to result in greater
per capita transfers, which is consistent with empirical ndings in the literature (Wright,
1974, Porto and Sanguinetti, 2001, Khemani, 2007). Population is generally negatively and
signicantly correlated with scal transfers, probably denoting a disproportionate lobbying
power of smaller communes. Beyond the e¤ect of political considerations, ethnic fractional-
ization is positively correlated with per capita scal transfers. It indicates that the central
government may use transfers as a pacication instrument as Treisman (1996) suggested.
Our results are robust to the introduction of a trend variable, a cluster department and
year dummies. Moreover, the impact of scal incapacity remains negative when we correct
for potential simultaneity bias and our conclusions do not change when we use alternative
indicators of political a¢ liation and ethnic fractionalization. Finally, our ndings are similar
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when we consider the dynamic model even if the lagged dependant variable appears to be not
signicant, which is not surprising in a context of developing country where central transfers
are instable.
4 Conclusion
This paper exploits an original public nance panel data allowing us to test political economy
theories of scal transfers for a developing country, Senegal. The estimation of a panel data
for 67 communes from 1997 to 2009 suggests that the allocation system in Senegal does not
conform to the dictates of normative theory. In particular, equity concerns do not appear
to a¤ect the allocation of intergovernmental scal transfers. On the contrary, wealthier local
governments seem to receive greater intergovernmental transfers. Moreover, our results tend
to show that the allocation of transfers follows a tactical redistribution by targeting swing
communes and to conrm that local governments with more political power receive larger
transfers. The Senegalese case also emphasizes the importance of ethnic considerations and
the fact that the central government may use transfers as a tactical instrument to pacify frac-
tionalized areas. Our ndings are consistent with those observed in other countries. Indeed,
intergovernmental transfers are generally allocated in a needs-equalizing way but are counter-
equalizing when it comes to scal capacity, and political economy factors are consistently a
driving force in determining the distribution of intergovernmental scal transfers.
Our work adds to empirical evidence from around the world that has shown several
instances in which politicians in central government make scal decisions by optimizing their
electoral objectives and being inuenced by political factors beyond economic considerations.
It shows that results found for developed countries can actually be observed for a developing
country. This study also highlights that an allocation system based on a formula can be
insu¢ cient to eliminate politically motivated allocation of transfers. Eliminating discretion
seems to require more than a formula. Delegating responsibility for the distribution of
resources across local governments to an independent agency could help to mitigate such
distortions (Khemani, 2007).
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